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In th~ Supr~m~ Court of th~ 
Stat~ of Utah 
RALPH E. CHILD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF 
THE INDUSTRIAL COM-
MISSION OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH DEPARTMENT 
OF E M P L 0 Y M E N T SE-
CURITY, 
Defendant. 
CASE 
NO. 8873 
Brief of Appellant, Ralph E. Child 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
That the appellant, Ralph E. Child, has com-
plied with each and every requirement pertinent 
to eligibility, as written in Section 35-4-4, Utah 
Code Annotated. 
The appellant is an office.r of the Ralph Child 
Construction Company and has been since the 
formation of that construction company on or about 
April 1, 1956, his office and title being that of 
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President and Director. The corporation has five 
officers, all of whom served in a policy making 
capacity and for such service received no pay, at 
least until the time of this hearing, it being the 
decision of the Board of Directors that no pay 
would be paid but that their compensation would 
be received temporarily on the basis of stock ap-
preciation. The Board of Directors then consisted of 
three officers of the company, to-wit: Ralph E. 
Child as President, Earl Child as Vice President, 
and Lois Child as Secretary. It was the function of 
these officers to serve and carry out the formal re-
quirements of the corporation, for which they 
would receive a nominal sum commensurate with 
their activity. The physical operation of the 
company was delegated to a Manager and 
Superintendent and in that respect the Board 
of Directors and officers retained the services 
of Ralph E. Child in the capacity of Manager 
and supervisor, for which he was to receive a week-
ly wage in the amount of $165.00. The corporation 
began to function along the lines set forth in the 
purpose clause of its Articles, to-wit: as a general 
contractor, and the duties of managing and direct-
ing the affairs of the company, except for the for-
mal requirements, fell upon the manager and super-
visor, Ralph E. Child. The company functioned nor-
mally until about May of 1957, when work became 
slack and the corporation '"as without funds. At 
this time they still employed Ralph E. Child as 
manager and supervisor to clean up the work of the 
corporation that had been incurred and to accu1nu-
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late the company's assets, such as equipment, etc., 
and to complete such work as was still remaining 
to be done. However, there was no money received 
and the corporation was, for practical purposes, in-
solvent. That being the circumstances, the company 
paid Mr. Child by check, it being his understanding 
and instruction that he could not cash the checks 
until the corporation had moneys in the bank to 
cover them. This status continued until approxi-
mately December of 1957, at which time it was de-
termined by the Board of Directors of the corpora-
tion that the con1pany must reduce its overhead and 
eliminate all help not absolutely necessary, and, 
therefore, discharge Ralph E. Child as manager 
and superintendent. The only functions that were 
left in the company were those small ministerial 
matters that normally befall a president and ex-
ecutive officers of the corporation. The active func-
tion of the corporation for the purpose for which it 
was designed were terminated. During all the times 
in which the corporation was organized and func-
tioning and during all of the times that Ralph E. 
Child was employed as manager and supervisor for 
the corporation, unemployment compensation was 
paid by the corporation upon his salary as manager 
and supervisor. This was required of the corpora-
tion by law and the corporation felt duly obligated 
to pay it inasmuch as its attitude toward Ralph E. 
Child was one of employer-employee relationship. 
No objection was ever made by the Industrial Com-
mission to the receipt of these moneys and no pro-
test was made by Ralph E. Child or the corporation 
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as to his capacity as an employee of that company, 
as distinguished from an officer or director. 
It should be noted that during the year 1956 
and 1957 the company did substantial work and 
paid substantial salaries and wages to its employees 
and that the work and duties of the manager and 
supervisor were extensive, but that the obligations 
of the president and director were relatively con-
stant during the years 1956-1957 and 1958. That 
the Board of Directors and officers of the corpora-
tion have functioned in approximately the same 
capacity during all of the time the corporation has 
been organized, but that the work of the employees 
of the corporation has varied directly with the 
work available. That on or about December 26, 
1957, the appellant, Ralph E. Child, filed his claim 
with the Industrial Commission for unemployment 
compensation because of his discharge and termina-
tion as manager and supervisor of the Ralph Child 
Construction Company. That the matter was re-
viewed by a referee for the Industrial Commission 
who rejected the claim of the appellant, whereupon 
the appellant appealed to the Board of Reviews for 
a review which affirmed the decision of the referee 
and rejected the appellant's claim. Whereupon the 
appellant directed this appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1 
That Ralph E. Child, as manager and super-
visor of the Ralph Child Construction Company, 
was an employee within the meaning of the Unem-
ployment Con1pensation Act and was entitled to 
unemployment compensation upon his termination 
and discharge as manager and supervisor. 
ARGUMENT 
The findings of the appeals referee and the 
Board of Review have put great emphasis upon the 
fact that Ralph E. Child served in a dual capacity, 
to-wit: President and director, and as manager and 
supervisor. The Board of Review has consented the 
fact that the president of the corporation still has 
fun~tions to perform as it being a factor prohibits 
Ralph E. Child, he being the same person, from re-
ceiving unemployment compensation. Both of these 
bodies have overlooked and failed to distinguish 
between the functions and duties of a manager and 
the functions and duties of a president and direc-
tor of a corporation. The Court well knows that 
these responsibilities are not the same. The court 
is invited to take judicial knowledg·e of the fact 
that officers and directors of corporations often as-
sume only nominal responsibilities of policy making 
and ministerial nature, for which they receive, in 
many cases only a nominal salary. This is the usual 
case and the president and dire~tor is ordinarily 
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required in small corporations only to perform 
those formal duties that are required, such as 
signing the contracts, and performing the formal 
legal obligations of the corporation. In other words, 
it is a common practice for the president of the 
corporation to function in those capacities that 
have legal significance in respect to the corpora-
tion's relationship to other persons or corporations. 
This is distinguished from the responsibilities of 
the manager of the corporation who is charged 
with the responsibility of the actual active conduct 
of the corporation for the purposes for which it 
was organized. The court is invited to consider as 
an analogy the relationship between the president 
and board of directors of the usual banking estab-
lishment. No one would contend that in a banking 
organization the manager could also be an officer 
and director and still be discharged as manager or 
replaced and be allowed to maintain his president 
and directorship in the said banking organization. 
I call this to the Court's attention because I can 
think of numerous examples in the small banking 
organizations of the State of Utah, with which I 
am acquainted. Furthermore, the responsibilities 
of a manager and a president of a corporation are 
grossly different. When the reasons for which the 
manager was hired ceased to exist, it is only 
natural and proper that he be discharged and it is 
the responsibility of the officers and directors to 
see that this is done. They are charged by law with 
this responsibility, for it is their duty to maintain 
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the assets of the corporation and protect the rights 
of the stockholders. 
No exception should be taken to the fact 
that one person served in a dual capacity. The 
very existence of a corporation anticipates this re-
lationship. The corporation itself is nothing more 
than an artificial person and can function only 
through human beings. No one would contend that 
the president of a corporation cannot be in two 
capacities, one individually for himself as a human 
being and one on behalf of the corporation. If that 
is so, is there any more reason for the court or the 
referee or the board of review to conclude that he 
cannot serve in three capacities, one as a human 
being, two as the president of a corporation, and 
three as a manager of the corporation, each capa-
city being separate and distinct. 
Let us consider the effect of the board of re-
view's decision. The only way that an employee, 
who is also an officer, can recover unemployment 
compensation would be, under the circumstance 
wherein the corporation was dissolved. If he had 
any fun~tion to perform at all in his capacity as 
an officer or director of the corporation, he would, 
within the decision of the referee and the board 
of review, still be employed and, therefore, not en-
titled to compensation, but the decision of the board 
of review and the referee in this case s,eems to be a 
one -vvay street. They want to include Ralph E. Child 
as an employee as distinguished from the president 
and director when collecting unemployment cmn-
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pensation insurance, but want to consider him as 
employed as president and director as distinguish-
ed from manager when ruling upon his right 
for unemployment compensation. I could find no 
cases directly in point on this particular subject 
matter, although there are numerous cases wherein 
it has been cited that an officer may also be an em-
ployee within the meaning of the act. For example: 
"In the case of the State ex rei Murphy vs. 
Welch, it was held that the President and Vice 
President for a corporation who worked in the 
company's store and received weekly wages 
were rightfully counted as 'employees' in deter-
mining whether the company had the number 
of employees necessary to come under the un-
employment compensation act," 
State ex rei Murphy vs. Welch 
187 Okla. 470 103 P2d 533 
This case is almost exactly in point in respect to 
the relationship of the officers and directors of the 
company. In that case the officers also worked as 
employees for a wage, the same as the officers did 
in this particular case. It would seem that if an 
officer is an employee for one purpose he is an 
employee for another purpose and that purpose be-
ing to receive unemployment compensation. To con-
sider this case above cited in the light of the board 
of review and the referee's decision would mean 
that the only ·time the company's store clerks could 
receive unemployment compensation in Oklahoma 
if they were officers would be \Yhen the corporation 
was dissolved. I cannot believe that that was the 
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interpretation of the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The 
functions of the Unemployment act should be re-
ciprocal and it should be a two way street. 
Another case that might be analogous, but not 
directly in point is the case of Ii Re: Lishner. This 
is a New York case in which the claimant was the 
owner of 50rc of the capital stock of a business cor-
poration which wholly owned a summer resort 
hotel. He worked for the summer resort hotel as 
manager. The New York Court denied his right to 
recover unemployment compensation because the 
activity he was engaged in was a seasonal activity 
and seasonal activities are not covered by unem-
ployment compensation. However, no objection was 
made to his claim for compensation on the basis 
that he was not an employee within the meaning of 
the act, or that he was not unemployed within the 
meaning of the act. It seems in the New York case 
that the mere fact that he was a stockholder and 
officer of the corporation did not prevent him from 
being unemployed as an employee of the corpora-
tion and the only reason in that case for which 
recovery was denied was because he was engaged 
in a seasonal occupation for which coverage was 
not allowed. This seems by anology to be in point 
In Re: Leshner 268 Appellant Division 582, 52 New 
York Supplement 2d 587 and an annotation may be 
found in 24 ALR 2d 1401. 
As I mentioned, there are not many cases on 
this subject matter, although I do not claim to be 
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an expert in legal research. I do find in 48 AMJ 
Page 524 at Section 16, some interesting comments 
that indicate that a person may serve in a dual 
capacity for the purpose of paying unemployment 
compensation insuran0e. There seems to be no case, 
either in AMJ or ALR or in the annotations under 
the Utah Code that have had the problem of wheth-
er an employee who is also an officer is entitled to 
compensation when discharged as an employee but 
retains his position as an officer. The analogy above 
cited, as well as the one set forth in AMJ, however, 
should be helpful. For example, in the AMJ citation 
above cited it stated as follows: 
"While the status of an officer of a cor-
poration as an 'employee' thereof within the 
meaning of the Social Security and Unemploy-
ment Insurance Acts often presents a difficult 
problem, it seems clear that under both the 
Federal and State acts the mere fact that one 
is an officer or has an interest in the business, 
corporation, or firm alleged to come within 
the operation of the acts, does not itself pre-
clude such person from being an employee 
within the meaning of the acts. In fact, the 
Federal and some of state a~ts provided that 
the term 'employee' includes an officer of a 
corporation." 
I regret that I have not more citations to pre-
sent, however, this type case does not seem to have 
been decided before. The mere fact that it hasn't 
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been decided before, would not seem to me to 
preclude a decision that is necessary and essential 
to persons such as I who are being taken advantage 
of by state agencies. If we are employees for one 
purpose we are employees for another purpose. It 
seems consistent that if they desire to require the 
employer to pay unemployment compensation on of-
ficers who also serve in a dual capacity as en1-
ployees, it is only fair and consistent to pay unem-
ployment compensation when that same person is 
unemployed as an employee, even though he is not 
unemployed as an officer. To hold otherwise would 
be to authorize a form of penalty or taxation con-
trary to what the legislature intended when it en-
acted the law. It would seem ~that within the defini-
tions of employment stated in Utah Code Annotated 
35-4-22 that Ralph Child Construction Company 
constitutes an employing unit and Ralph E. Child 
himself as manager constitutes an employee. 
I respectfully urge the court to consider the 
circumstance and to render a judgment ·either al-
lowing the unemployment compensation remanded 
or requiring a refund of the unemployment conl-
pensation insurance collected. It seems that one or 
the other is mandatory. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RALPH E. CHILD 
Appellant 
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